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Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 1 February 2017 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I write to you today to convey our alarm at the decision by the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, to proceed with plans for the construction of another 3,000 units in Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in direct, grave contravention of international law and Security Council resolutions and in defiance of the international community.

In less than two weeks, the Israeli Government, which is blatantly exploiting transitions in the global political landscape, is moving ahead with unlawful schemes for the construction of more than 6,000 settlement units on occupied Palestinian land. This is a rate unprecedented in recent years and surpassing that of the entirety of 2016, a year in which Israel demonstrated persistent, systematic and deliberate contempt for the demands of the international community to cease all of its settlement activities, abide by its legal obligations and commit in good faith to the two-State solution on the basis of the 1967 lines.

Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) was unequivocally clear in this regard. Its adoption reflects a firm and long-standing global consensus on the matter and has been broadly deemed timely and imperative, considering the dangers confronting the two-State solution and the real risks for further escalation and destabilization of the situation on the ground.

Here it must be recalled that, in its resolution 2334 (2016), the Security Council, inter alia:

> 1. *Reaffirms* that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a

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major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace;

2. *Reiterates* its demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard.

Moreover, in its resolution 2334 (2016), the Security Council calls, inter alia, for affirmative steps to be taken immediately to reverse the negative trends on the ground that are imperilling the two-State solution, and calls upon both parties to act on the basis of international law, including international humanitarian law, and their previous agreements and obligations, to observe calm and restraint, and to refrain from provocative actions, incitement and inflammatory rhetoric.

There is no question that Israel is blatantly and flagrantly violating all of these provisions and all other relevant Security Council resolutions. Confronted with such unlawful, aggressive behaviour, the international community cannot remain silent. The Council's credibility and international law are at stake.

It is urgent that all provisions of resolution 2334 (2016) be immediately upheld and implemented in the face of such egregious violations and blatant disrespect for the authority and legislation of the Security Council. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Council's decisions cannot simply remain words on paper, but must be respected. This is the obligation of every State, without exception.

There must be firm condemnation of the recent Israeli decisions and clear reiteration of the demand for cessation of all settlement activities. This is urgent, for we are at a critical crossroads. Such illegal Israeli measures will lead to the further confiscation of Palestinian land, the forced displacement of more Palestinian civilians and the transfer of tens of thousands more Israeli settlers to Occupied Palestine, including East Jerusalem, more deeply enmeshing the two populations, entrenching the occupation and facilitating Israeli annexation plans to acquire more land by force, which are being pushed for and boasted about by members of the Israeli Government, along with other extremist voices.

If not stopped, such actions will irrevocably destroy the two-State solution, along with the comprehensive peace prospects boldly presented by the Arab Peace Initiative. Upon their destruction, it is Israel, the occupying Power, that must be held accountable, and the international community must also face up to its own responsibilities to resolve, justly and viably, this decades-long conflict and injustice.

The Palestinian people will never accept a situation of "perpetual occupation". There is actually no such thing as "perpetual occupation". International humanitarian law clearly stipulates that situations of foreign occupation are to be temporary, a criterion long-exceeded and grossly violated by Israel. The current and looming situation has all of the hallmarks of an apartheid situation. It is not only the Palestinian people and their leaders, but also the international community as a whole that will be compelled to deal with it as such, if the purposes and principles of the Charter are to stand and be defended, if human rights are to be respected, if civilians are to be protected and if the rule of law, the underpinning of our world order, is to be upheld.

We are not just at a turning point; we are arriving at the point of no return, and the death knell for the two-State solution is near. This is neither an exaggeration nor a threat; it is the reality. We thus reiterate our call for the Security Council, supported by all concerned and responsible States, to act immediately to salvage the minimal prospects for peace and for a new era in the Middle East that may remain.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 604 previous letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 27 January 2017 (A/ES-10/741-S/2017/83), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2017/97

Security Council

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Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat

I. Introduction

1. In adopting its resolution 2253 (2015), the Security Council expressed its determination to address the threat posed to international peace and security by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh)[1] and associated individuals and groups, and emphasized the importance of cutting off its access to funds and preventing it from planning and facilitating attacks. In paragraph 97 of the resolution, the Council requested that I provide an initial strategic-level report, followed by updates every four months thereafter.

2. The present report is the fourth such report (see S/2016/92, S/2016/501 and S/2016/830) and was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, in close collaboration with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2014) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and other relevant United Nations actors and international and regional organizations. In addition to providing an update on the gravity of the threat posed by ISIL and associated groups and entities, I also consider the presence and influence of ISIL outside Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, including in Europe, the Maghreb[2] and West Africa. Also addressed are the efforts of Member States of those regions to implement measures in a number of thematic areas, including in order to counter the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters who either return to their home States or travel to other States, as well as the efforts of the United Nations, its partners and

[1] Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

[2] Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

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international and regional organizations to support the undertakings of Member States.

II. Overview of the current threat

A. Emphasis by ISIL on external attacks

3. ISIL is militarily on the defensive in several regions, notably in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports from Member States, the group has not been able to withstand the sustained pressure within several conflict zones,[1] however, ISIL is partially adapting to this situation. For example, Member States highlighted that the internal communication and recruitment methods of the group are increasingly moving towards more covert methods, such as the use of the dark web, encryption and messengers. Furthermore, attacks perpetrated by ISIL in the Levant demonstrate the group's operational capabilities to expand its immediate areas of attack to neighbouring countries by using links to existing local cells. The group continues to encourage its followers and sympathizers outside conflict zones to perpetrate attacks. In several cases, Member States highlighted that foreign terrorist fighters with the core of ISIL reached out to specific individuals in their countries of origin to encourage attacks. The threat to the aviation sector remains high, as demonstrated by recent attacks against airports in Brussels in March and in Istanbul, Turkey, in June, and against a Daallo Airlines flight in February 2016. Recognizing the seriousness of this particular threat, the Security Council adopted resolution 2309 (2016) in September, emphasizing international efforts to counter the threat to aviation.

B. Foreign terrorist fighters and returnees

4. Member States emphasized that the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has slowed considerably due to increased control measures of Member States and the diminished "attractiveness" of the core of ISIL as a result of military pressure. One Member State reported that it anticipates that many foreign terrorist fighters will remain in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, given that most of them who intended to leave had already done so. Several Member States assessed that those who remain in the conflict zone will present a significant threat if they eventually return, given that most are staunchly committed to ISIL ideology. Some Member States neighbouring Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as in the Maghreb, highlighted that they are currently dealing with returnees from the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq travelling through their territory and the significant number of foreign terrorist fighters who were stopped en route to the Syrian Arab Republic. Some of those returnees will travel to their countries of origin or residence. Others may choose to travel to conflict zones in the region and beyond, thereby posing new risks. Therefore, the flow of returnees entails the risk of spreading the threat posed by individuals loyal to ISIL to new regions.

[1] Several Member States reported that the volume of ISIL core propaganda has declined as a result of military pressure. One also reported a change in the content of propaganda, which increasingly focuses on military engagements rather than on "state-building".

C. Financial decline of the core of ISIL continues

5. Since my previous report, the financial condition of ISIL has continued to deteriorate, forcing it to operate on a "crisis" budget.[4] The ability of ISIL to attract new recruits has diminished, and fighters are increasingly leaving the battlefield. Furthermore, as described in my previous report, ISIL has continued to impose an array of fees and fines,[5] while internal corruption and theft also continue to plague the group (see S/2016/830, paras. 4 and 5).

6. The significant pressure on the finances of ISIL notwithstanding, the composition of its revenue streams has not changed substantially, given that the group continues to rely mainly on income from hydrocarbon resources and extortion and "taxation", which together account for as much as 70 to 80 per cent of the group's income.[6] However, its income from hydrocarbon resources decreased markedly in 2016. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) estimates that, in 2016, ISIL earned approximately $260 million from illicit oil sales, mainly from oil fields in Deir Ezzor province, Syrian Arab Republic, compared with as much as $500 million in 2015 (see S/2016/92, para. 17). Oil prices are fluctuating considerably, and fuel is scarce. ISIL has nevertheless demonstrated its resourcefulness in fixing or adapting equipment and infrastructure damaged by international air strikes. Furthermore, ISIL appears to have sufficient funds to continue the fight, and many of its hardcore fighters appear prepared to remain and fight without a salary, given that it prioritizes its war machine over minimal services to the population.[7] In addition, despite being under extensive pressure militarily, ISIL continues to exploit cultural sites.

7. While the group's income will continue to shrink as it loses territory, it is crucial for the international community to remain vigilant against the efforts of ISIL to increase its previously minor income stream, or to cultivate new ones and its attempts to find innovative ways to move funds using channels subject to less stringent compliance procedures. Specifically, with the return of journalists and humanitarian workers to areas recaptured from ISIL, Member States have expressed concern about a potential increase in kidnapping for ransom, as well as its increased reliance on donations, including through the abuse of non-profit organizations and fundraising websites.

8. One Member State indicated that it intercepted ISIL facilitators carrying funds to the conflict zone and funds flowing out of the conflict zone. The same Member State reported that some foreign terrorist fighters maintain access to their home bank accounts. They ask sympathizers to transfer money to these accounts, which ISIL facilitators outside the conflict zone then withdraw and provide to ISIL. According to another Member State, due to the reduction by ISIL in fighters' salaries (see S/2016/501, para. 9), fighters are increasingly seeking financial aid

[4] The following is based on official information provided by Member States, unless otherwise indicated.

[5] According to UNAMI, ISIL imposed fines on those selling cigarettes illegally in Mosul, and petty smugglers were fined between $30 and $50.

[6] Other sources of income include kidnapping for ransom, looting of antiquities, external donations, the sale of electricity and agricultural products, and human trafficking.

[7] According to a Member State, ISIL has been reducing its administrative and social expenses.

from relatives in that Member State, resulting in an increase in financial transfers from that State to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. The transfers are made using remittance companies, and the funds are collected in third countries and delivered by couriers to the conflict zone.

III. Evolving threat posed by ISIL

9. To highlight the threat presented by ISIL to various regions of the globe, in this report I focus on Europe, the Maghreb and West Africa.

A. Threat to Europe

10. ISIL declared its intent to attack Europe in a speech by Abou Mohamed Al Adnani (QDi.325) in September 2014, in which he called for attacks on the United States of America and countries in Europe in retribution for air strikes against ISIL. ISIL has since conducted a range of attacks in Europe, some of which have been directed and facilitated by personnel specifically sent from its core in the Syrian Arab Republic, such as the attacks in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in March 2016. In addition, the group enabled attacks in Europe by providing guidance or assistance and inspired a wide range of further attacks through its propaganda.

11. Member States reported that ISIL enablers, primarily based in the Syrian Arab Republic, have encouraged ISIL supporters to mount attacks in their countries of residence. These enablers are organized on a country, regional and language basis and engage online with individuals in their country of origin or previous residence to conduct attacks. The wide range of nationalities, languages and previous places of residence among foreign terrorist fighters in territory held by ISIL increases their global reach.

12. ISIL uses sophisticated online publications to highlight a range of attack methodologies and provide designs for improvised explosive devices. The use of a truck to attack the Christmas market in Berlin on 19 December 2016 mirrors the methodology of the attack in Nice, France, on 14 July 2016. As demonstrated by the tragic loss of life resulting from the attacks in Nice and Berlin and the subsequent attack in a nightclub in Istanbul on 1 January 2017, attacks by individuals inspired by ISIL require few resources but can have devastating consequences. Many of the attacks that appear to have been inspired, conducted in the name of and claimed by ISIL were initially reported as "lone actor" attacks, although subsequent investigations demonstrate that the individuals often received support or resources from other extremists and/or criminal groups.

13. Since my previous report, ISIL has failed to direct any complex, large-scale attacks in Western Europe. According to Member States, this may be due to several factors. The pressure on the core of ISIL in the conflict zone has absorbed considerable resources of the group. In addition, ISIL fighters have experienced increased difficulty travelling from the conflict zone to Europe owing to measures taken by Member States. Moreover, large-scale police and security measures in a range of countries have disrupted both plots and cells across Europe. Member States currently assess, however, that the threat of large-scale attacks remains: according to

one Member State, not all of the operatives of ISIL believed to have been dispatched to Europe to conduct the Paris and Brussels attacks have so far been identified and arrested.

14. Member States have reported that the flow of European foreign terrorist fighters to ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq slowed considerably during 2016 due to a combination of factors. The military campaigns, which have resulted in ISIL losing large numbers of fighters and territory, together with the group's deteriorating financial situation have considerably reduced its draw for foreign terrorist fighters. The measures taken by many European Member States to restrict travel to conflict zones, and in particular measures taken by the Government of Turkey, have also hindered the ability of European foreign terrorist fighters to travel to ISIL-held territory in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.

15. As reported by the Monitoring Team in its eighteenth report, the number of foreign terrorist fighters returning to European countries, potentially intending to perpetrate attacks, in combination with those being radicalized within those countries, presents a growing security challenge (see S/2016/629, para. 4). European Member States have reported that between 15 and 40 per cent of their nationals and residents who travelled to Iraq and the Syrian Arabic Republic have now returned. Some highlighted that this includes a rising number of female returnees. A proportion of those returning present a significant threat and are facing appropriate legal and control measures. Other returnees are reported to have become disillusioned with the fighting and the distorted ideology of ISIL and therefore represent a lower threat.

16. A number of Member States reported that they expect that only a small proportion of European foreign terrorist fighters remaining in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic will return home or relocate to other fighting zones. One Member State reported that some are likely to be deterred from returning to their home country for fear of arrest. Others who would like to leave are unable to, due to the group's own control measures. In addition, casualty rates among ISIL fighters are very high and such high rates will continue. One Member State estimated that only 1 in 10 of those remaining and previously resident in Europe will attempt to return, however, those remaining would be hardened fighters and present a significant threat.

B. Threat to Maghreb and West Africa

17. In Libya, the military offensive has dislodged ISIL from the city of Sirte, one of its most important strongholds outside Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. According to Member States, this has reduced the group's access to resources and operational space. Member States also highlighted that the threat posed by ISIL to Libya and neighbouring countries has not been eliminated. The group's defeat in Sirte led its fighters to disperse and move to other parts of the country. Member States highlighted that overall ISIL has maintained operational capabilities in Libya, as illustrated by recent operations, such as a suicide attack in Benghazi on 18 December 2016, in which several soldiers were killed.[5] Estimates of Member

[5] "Suicide bomber kills seven in Libyan city of Benghazi: officials", Reuters, 18 December 2016.

States vary as to the number of the group's fighters in Libya, ranging from several hundred to as many as 3,000.

18. ISIL continues to present a serious threat to countries neighbouring Libya. On 6 November 2016, ISIL claimed responsibility for the killing of a Tunisian soldier in Kasserine,[9] and, on 15 November, it claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device attack that wounded 12 Tunisian soldiers.[10] On 11 December 2016, a suicide attack in a cathedral in Cairo killed 25 people. ISIL claimed that the assailant was one of its fighters and threatened to stage further attacks in Egypt.[11]

19. Member States assess that the continuing pressure on ISIL in Libya could lead to ISIL adopting a modus operandi that is more akin to other Al-Qaida affiliates, which could mean that some cells within ISIL may look for a rapprochement with Al-Qaida's affiliates in the region.

20. Although ISIL in Libya experienced setbacks since my previous report, the group has increased its presence in West Africa and the Sahel, as demonstrated by recent ISIL-related attacks in the Niger and Burkina Faso.[12] However, currently the group does not control significant amounts of territory in these regions.

21. Amaq News Agency, one of the propaganda outlets of ISIL, announced on 30 October 2016 that one splinter faction of Al Mourabitoun led by Lehbib Ould Ali had pledged loyalty to ISIL.[13] This development may result in an elevated risk environment within the region. Several Member States emphasized that the core of ISIL had not confirmed the affiliation of this splinter faction. According to the assessment of Member States, this faction may therefore be highly motivated to commit large-scale terrorist acts in order to demonstrate the added value it brings to the core of ISIL as an affiliate.

22. According to Member States, Boko Haram,[14] which declared its loyalty to ISIL in March 2015, is plagued by an internal power struggle and has split into two factions (see S/2016/629, para. 38). One faction continues to be led by Abubakar Mohammed Shekau (QDi.322), and the other is led by Abu Musab Al Barnawi (not listed), the former spokesman of the group. Al Barnawi aims at maintaining an affiliation with ISIL as the group's "West Africa province".[15] Member States highlighted that the Shekau faction, in particular, is under continuous military pressure and confined to the south of the state of Borno and the Sambisa forest.

23. Boko Haram is mainly locally funded. It relies on donations, extortion, theft, including of cattle, commercial activities, such as sponsoring food vendors, and

[9] Amaq News Agency, press release on social media, 6 November 2016.

[10] "Claimed by ISIL", Amaq News Agency, press release on social media, 15 November 2016.

[11] "Killing and wounding nearly 80 crusaders in martyrdom-seeking operation in downtown Cairo", communiqué released on social media, 13 December 2016.

[12] Information provided by a Member State.

[13] Amaq News Agency announcement, distributed by Telegram, 30 October 2016. Al-Sahrawi individually had once before pledged allegiance to ISIL in May 2015. Lehbib Ould Ali also uses the nom de guerre "Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi".

[14] Listed as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (QDe.138).

[15] Information provided by a Member State. Al-Naba newspaper, affiliated with ISIL, published an interview with Al Barnawi on Telegram and Twitter, 2 August 2016 identifying Al Barnawi as "governor" of ISIL's "West Africa province".

kidnapping for ransom.[16] Both factions of Boko Haram are financially under strain, and many of their attacks are actually supply runs to steal provisions, such as food and equipment.[17] Member States further indicated that both factions of Boko Haram are no longer able to pay all of their fighters a monthly salary. This has already led to some defections from the group.

24. Boko Haram nevertheless remains a serious threat to regional security, with several thousand combatants still under its command.[18] Most of them have been locally recruited, in addition to the foreign terrorist fighters recruited from the same ethnic tribes as Nigerian Boko Haram fighters. Boko Haram continues to use vulnerable members of the population as suicide bombers, in particular women and children, which remains of concern to Member States.

25. Some Member States highlighted their concern about the ongoing attempts by Boko Haram to spread its influence and commit terrorist acts beyond Nigeria. They noted that Boko Haram is using improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks for sporadic actions outside of Nigeria.

IV. Responses to the evolving threat

A. Overview

26. The United Nations, Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations continue to strengthen national and international frameworks to respond to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and to specifically address the global threat posed by ISIL-related trends. On 12 December, at the high-level briefing on international judicial cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and in Security Council resolution 2322 (2016), the Council called upon all States to consider establishing laws and mechanisms that allow for the broadest possible international cooperation, including by downgrading, where appropriate, intelligence for the purposes of sharing it, exchanging biometric and biographic information, engaging in informal police cooperation, exchanging financial information and strengthening mutual legal assistance, and emphasized the need for a coordinated and robust response.[19]

27. Pursuant to the presidential statement of 29 May 2015 (PRST/2015/11), the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team developed a capacity-building implementation plan to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The 37 project proposals address the life cycle of the phenomenon of foreign terrorist

[16] Information provided by a Member State and Financial Action Task Force-Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa-Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa, Terrorist financing in West and Central Africa (Paris, FATF, 2016), pp. 10-17 and 33.

[17] Information provided by a Member State.

[18] Information provided by a Member State.

[19] In its resolution 71/248, the General Assembly established the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

fighters. Funding in the amount of $27 million, or 22.8 per cent of the total budget of the plan, has been confirmed (see S/2016/92, S/2016/501 and S/2016/830). The Task Force is in the process of reviewing the plan to respond to the changing nature of the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters.

1. Measures to curtail travel and transit

28. In its resolution 71/19, adopted by consensus, the General Assembly called for the strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) on transnational organized crime and terrorism, including preventing foreign terrorist fighter travel. Addressing critical gaps in global screening efforts is essential to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.[20] INTERPOL noted that, between October 2016 and January 2017, there was a 63 per cent increase in the number of profiles of foreign terrorist fighters accessible in real time through its criminal information system and a 750 per cent increase in the sharing of information by Member States. As at 20 December, there were 14,338 such profiles in the INTERPOL criminal analysis file on foreign terrorist fighters.

29. Designing and implementing comprehensive border-management strategies continues to be difficult for many Member States. The Security Council has called upon Member States to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities,[21] but only 56 Member States have done so to date.[22] The United Nations is currently providing related assistance to States that are among the 78 identified as the most affected by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and have not yet implemented advance passenger information systems.[23] During the reporting period, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and partners continued to organize regional workshops on advance passenger information in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa. The workshops focused on international standards and national legal, institutional and technical requirements in order to allow for in-depth capacity-building.

30. The Security Council has also called upon Member States to require that airlines under their jurisdiction provide passenger name records to national authorities, where appropriate, but implementation continues to be uneven. Some States have also voluntarily begun to apply passenger name records requirements to ocean and sea traffic and cruise ships, but a lack of appropriate regulation continues to represent a significant vulnerability.

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[20] The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, relevant United Nations entities and Member States contributed to a Centre/Global Counter-terrorism Forum document on good practices in the area of border security and management in the context of counter-terrorism and stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, issued in September, that promotes a comprehensive, cooperative, coordinated, and integrated border security management; and the development of a five-year border security management project of the Centre.

[21] See Security Council 2309 (2016); S/2015/377; and Security Council resolution 2178 (2014).

[22] Data as at November 2016.

[23] The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is implementing the project jointly with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Monitoring Team, the International Air Transport Association, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Organization for Migration and INTERPOL.

2. Measures to counter the financing of ISIL

31. During a joint special meeting of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Financial Action Task Force on depriving terrorist groups from accessing, raising and moving funds: practices and lessons learned, held in December, participants noted that ISIL continued to use a wide range of funding methods, including extortion, exploitation of natural resources, small businesses and trafficking activities. The Task Force secretariat has gathered data on the group's funding sources with a view to making available to the member States of the Task Force and similar regional bodies triannual analyses to assist in their efforts to deprive ISIL of funds. Since February 2016, thwarting the financing of ISIL has been included in the agenda of plenary meetings as a permanent item.

3. Prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration

32. United Nations entities continue to support the efforts of Member States to strengthen criminal justice. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a new *Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons* at the end of November.[24] Drawing on this guidance, UNODC and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, in close consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, have developed a proposal for a technical assistance programme, to be funded by the European Union, the Centre and other donors. The programme aims at strengthening the capacities of national prison administrations to manage violent extremist prisoners in order to prevent radicalization leading to violence by establishing safe, secure and humane conditions in prisons, supporting prisoners in their disengagement from violence and assisting in their reintegration into society upon release.

4. Addressing conflict-related sexual violence and vulnerable groups

33. At the 7847th meeting of the Security Council, on 20 December 2016, which was a ministerial-level open debate, the Council discussed the issue of trafficking in persons in conflict situations, and Member States acknowledged that armed conflicts generate mass displacement of particularly vulnerable groups and create circumstances conducive to exploitation and urged the adoption of human rights-compliant approaches to the management of conflict-driven refugee and migrant flows. In its resolution 2331 (2016), the Security Council recognized the connection between trafficking in persons, sexual violence and terrorism and other transnational organized criminal activities, and condemned all acts of trafficking in persons for the purpose of supporting terrorist organizations or individual terrorists as serious crimes that Member States must appropriately prosecute and penalize. In previous reports, I recalled that ISIL and other groups were using trafficking and sexual violence as a weapon of terror and a source of revenue and that ISIL had engaged in the sexual enslavement of women and girls through trafficking (see S/2016/92,

[24] For the English version, see www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf. Other language versions of the *Handbook*, including in Arabic, French and Russian will be made available in February 2017.

S/2016/501, S/2016/766, and S/2016/949).[25] In a letter dated 20 December addressed to the President of the Security Council, my predecessor conveyed a special report of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict on crimes committed by ISIL, so as to enhance the knowledge and understanding of the members of the Council of the systematic use of sexual violence as a tactic of terrorism and its links to the trafficking in persons (S/2016/1090).

34. In response, some States have instituted special procedures to screen refugees and asylum seekers, particularly those arriving from areas affected by ISIL, to identify victims of trafficking (see S/2016/949). However, the sheer numbers of refugees and asylum seekers could strain existing capacities.[26] UNODC has also assisted government agencies and non-governmental organizations in developing proactive and systematic approaches to the screening and identification of victims of trafficking among refugees and displaced persons fleeing from conflicts.

5. Use of information and communications technology, enhanced cooperation with the private sector and the ability to prosecute

35. On 1 December, at the special meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism on preventing the exploitation of information and communications technologies for terrorist purposes, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, participants recognized that the use of media platforms had enabled ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities to spread propaganda, share training materials, engage in illicit trading in weapons, identify potential recruits, generate funds and carry out attacks.[27] The online activity of ISIL has fuelled unprecedented growth in the number of foreign terrorist fighters travelling to and from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya, while a lack of legislative coherence across Member States and the absence of an international definition of "terrorist content" pose practical challenges for Governments attempting to gather and share digital information and evidence for investigations and prosecutions.

36. In efforts to combat ISIL online, Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations have increasingly sought to form partnerships with communications service providers and other private companies. In December, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube announced their intention to develop a joint database containing "digital fingerprints" of violent extremist images, designed to facilitate the removal of content that violates website terms and conditions.

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[25] See also Human Rights Council conference room paper A/HRC/32/CRP.2.

[26] The *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.IV.6) found that an increasing number of trafficking victims from conflict-affected States, such as the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Somalia, was detected in States in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "As Mosul displacement continues, UNHCR steps up assistance", briefing note, 11 November 2016, available from www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2016/11/5825912b4/mosul-displacement-continues-unhcr-steps-assistance.html; and A/71/384.

[27] The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate organized a technical meeting on the same topic on 30 November, as well as a side event on the misuse of social media for terrorist-financing purposes on 13 December.

B. Europe

1. Measures to curtail travel and transit

37. The increased use of INTERPOL screening databases reflects increased efforts to interdict foreign terrorist fighters. The number of searches conducted in November 2016 was greater than that for the whole of 2015, an increase of 56 per cent across the European Union and 129 per cent within the Schengen zone. A European intelligence platform, under the auspices of the Counter-Terrorism Group on 1 July 2016, was established to facilitate the sharing of real-time intelligence information about suspected foreign terrorist fighters and other terrorists. Article 7 of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism provides for the implementation of a network, available on a 24 hours a day, seven days a week basis, for the exchange of timely information on foreign terrorist fighters. As at December 2016, 33 States members of the Council of Europe had designated contact points.[28]

38. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) promotes cooperation between its participating States by harmonizing border-related policies and practices, and its Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network and its Policing On-Line Information System, known as POLIS, also serve as platforms to exchange border-related information and experiences.

39. Few European States have implemented advance passenger information systems (see S/2015/683). Although some have introduced advance passenger information requirements, airlines are not all required to collect and transmit this information to national authorities on a systematic basis. The European Union directive adopted in April 2016 on the use of passenger name records for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crimes notwithstanding, to date, only three European States have introduced a requirement for the use of passenger name records.

40. The launch of the European Border and Coast Guard in October 2016 constituted a major step in strengthening the security of the external borders of the European Union. Each State member of the European Union is required to contribute to a standing corps of border guards and other relevant staff, which can be mobilized at short notice to address an emergency at the external border or launch a rapid border intervention.

41. The vast majority of refugees, both in Europe and globally, have no connection to terrorism and have fled their States of origin to escape persecution. Nevertheless, there have been isolated incidents in which persons who have sought, or been granted, asylum in Europe have subsequently been implicated in successful or foiled terrorist attacks. The Security Council has repeatedly called upon Member States to take measures to ensure that terrorists do not misuse asylum procedures, and to do so in a manner consistent with international refugee and human rights law.

42. In practice, Member States often encounter difficulties in taking such measures in a timely manner, especially where asylum seekers constitute part of a

[28] Security Council resolution 2322 (2016) recognizes the I-24/7 network of INTERPOL as a good practice.

large influx of migrants. South-Eastern Europe, in particular, continues to face challenges in this respect, owing to ongoing conflicts in neighbouring regions that have resulted in large flows of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, to and through the region, as well as the transit of foreign terrorist fighters to and from conflict zones. Regional bodies indicate that ISIL may continue to seek to abuse asylum procedures.[29] In response to these challenges, some European States rely on advanced capacities, such as radar and satellite technology, that enable coastguards to monitor the movement of vessels in real time. Some European States have also started to utilize data from the smartphones of asylum seekers who arrive without passports to check their identities and for screening and risk-assessment purposes.

2. Addressing inspired or enabled attacks

43. Some States indicate that the military setbacks sustained by ISIL may have prompted pre-existing terrorist networks in Europe to accelerate their plans for attacks in their States of origin and/or residence, without travelling to conflict zones.

44. Some States noted the benefits of establishing joint investigative teams for a fixed period and a specific purpose on the basis of an agreement between or among two or more law enforcement authorities in European Union member States. The European Police Office (Europol) and Eurojust provide support to joint investigative teams in terrorism cases to facilitate the timely exchange of information by States and to reduce the need to rely on more formal, and often lengthier, mutual legal assistance processes. Member States note that posting liaison magistrates or investigators in relevant agencies of other Member States, or in relevant organizations such as Europol or INTERPOL, can have similar benefits.

3. Measures to counter the financing of ISIL

45. Despite substantial progress made by European States, they continue to face challenges in effectively operationalizing measures that broaden the criminalization of terrorist financing to cover the financing of travel undertaken by foreign terrorist fighters (see S/2016/501).

46. Recognizing that transactions financing terrorism often involve small amounts of money, some States are evaluating whether current declaration thresholds for the cross-border transfer of cash or bearer-negotiable instruments are appropriate. In addition to imposing new regulations aimed at mitigating the vulnerabilities associated with prepaid debit cards, France has introduced the requirement that all transactions of 1,000 euros or more be traceable (cash payments are no longer accepted) and that cash deposits or withdrawals in excess of 10,000 euros per month and per customer be systematically reported to the financial intelligence unit. Belgium's financial intelligence unit recently put into place an action plan aimed at strengthening coordination among the various agencies involved in countering money-laundering and terrorist financing, granting it access to non-financial intelligence.

47. South-Eastern European States continue to face challenges relating to the cross-border illicit flows of money, as well as an elevated terrorism-financing risk

[29] Europol, "Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited", November 2016.

derived from the activities of non-profit organizations and informal remittance companies, and those States have taken some steps to address these issues, including undertaking national risk assessments on terrorism financing.

48. While the number of prosecutions for terrorism-financing offences remains low, there have been individual successes, including the recent conviction of two individuals in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for knowingly sending funds through an ISIL courier to a family member who had joined ISIL in Syria and the conviction of two others for providing cash, in person, to an individual suspected of involvement in the attacks in Brussels in March 2016.

4. Prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration

49. Delays in receiving responses to requests for mutual legal assistance continue to impede investigations and prosecutions. Member States highlighted the benefits of introducing informal, flexible methods of information-sharing with Member States with which they have close relationships to address challenges relating to evidence obtained from intelligence sources. Such informal arrangements can also facilitate swift responses within the framework of time-sensitive investigations.

50. Member States noted that radicalized individuals, disillusioned with life with ISIL in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic, who return to their country of origin or previous residence may not be willing to work with Governments to provide information or help to prevent the radicalization of others.

51. Eurojust continues to monitor related developments and trends in the legislation of Member States, and the European Commission works with relevant regional bodies to implement training programmes on counter-radicalization for prison and probation staff. In September 2016, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute organized a scenario-based tabletop exercise, using real cases, with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to identify potential gaps and solutions for rehabilitation and reintegration approaches.

5. Preventing and countering violent extremism

52. Member States are developing comprehensive approaches to countering and preventing violent extremism, including broadening partnerships with a range of stakeholders and non-governmental actors to increase the effectiveness of such strategies (see S/2015/939 and S/2016/501).

53. In follow up to the call by the European Commission, in April 2016, for renewed focus in the area of counter-radicalization, the European Union developed the "IMPACT Europe" project, which consists of an evaluation toolkit that draws on a knowledge database on radicalization factors and existing intervention, a training course and a manual, and the project on preventing interdicting and mitigating extremism, known as the "PRIME" project, to develop a model of "lone actor" extremist events.[50] These initiatives rely on the participation of individuals who are credible in the eyes of the targeted individual, such as former members of extremist groups, highlight the role of family, friends and the local community in the de-radicalization process and recognize the need to address psychological factors

[50] For more information on the projects, see http://impacteurope.eu and www.fp7-prime.eu.

and offer alternatives to individuals at risk of radicalization. OSCE also has ongoing initiatives in this area.

54. The European Commission is establishing a network aimed at enabling local stakeholders to invite positive role models from various backgrounds, including entrepreneurs, artists and athletes, to visit schools, youth associations, sports clubs and prisons to share experiences. The "No hate speech" movement of the Council of Europe seeks to raise the awareness of young people and the population at large about the risks of engaging in hate speech. Implemented through national campaigns in 45 States, the project provides alternative ways for young people to engage with each other, online and off line, for positive causes and has rallied partners active in various religious communities and groups. In July 2016, France opened a de-radicalization centre where young people at risk of radicalization can receive guidance on personal and professional matters.

6. Use of information and communications technology, enhanced cooperation with the private sector and the ability to prosecute

55. Deeply concerned by the continued abuse of the Internet and social media by ISIL and its affiliates to recruit new members and incite or glorify the commission of terrorist acts, some Member States and the Internet Referral Unit of Europol notify Internet companies hosting websites that contain terrorist content and request that they remove the content on the grounds that it is in breach of the company's terms and conditions.[31]

56. In mid-2016, the European Commission, together with Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft, established a code of conduct to combat the spread of hate speech online. In accordance with the code, companies committed to putting into place clear and effective processes to review notifications of illegal hate speech on their services so that they can remove or disable access to such content, also pledging to put into place rules or community guidelines to clarify their prohibition of incitement to violence.[32]

C. Maghreb and West Africa

1. General

57. States of the Maghreb and West Africa are pooling resources regionally to combat terrorism, mindful of their similar challenges, including lengthy, unregulated borders, and endemic problems such as trafficking in weapons, drugs and persons and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In the Lake Chad Basin region, for example, the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram continues to liberate villages, reopen supply lines and secure space for the return of

[31] See ICT4Peace Foundation-Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate "Private sector engagement in responding to the use of the Internet and ICT for terrorist purposes", December 2016, available from http://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Private-Sector-Engagement-in-Responding-to-the-Use-of-the-Internet-and-ICT-for-Terrorist-Purposes-2.pdf.

[32] European Commission, "Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online"; European Union response to Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate questionnaire regarding a comprehensive international framework to effectively counter terrorist narratives.

normal governance. In West Africa, the security platform of the Group of 5 for the Sahel was launched in November to promote regional cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the region on issues relating to terrorism and transnational organized crime. The Group has also stepped up its strategic engagement with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and UNODC, under the auspices of the of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre's Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism Initiative (I-ACT) in the Sahel, to identify priority capacity-building projects and secure essential support.

58. Following a year and a half of consultations, supported by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the President of Tunisia signed a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which entered into force on 7 November. In December, at a workshop organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations country team, participants sought to develop cooperation between the recently established National Counter-Terrorism Committee of Tunisia, the United Nations and civil society and to support efforts to ensure that the implementation of the strategy adheres to international human rights norms and standards. Supported by the United States Agency for International Development and the United Nations Development Programme, Mali is also developing a comprehensive national counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism strategy. Under I-ACT in Mali, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Executive Directorate and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are contributing to the drafting process, which is expected to be completed in March 2017.

2. Measures to curtail travel and transit

59. States of the Maghreb, especially Tunisia and Morocco, have increased their sharing of data on foreign terrorist fighters and their use of INTERPOL databases. Tunisia is extending the use of the INTERPOL I-24/7 global police communications system to its entire territory. INTERPOL has provided training in the Middle East and North Africa region in the use of the INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System, continues to support capacity-building efforts and provides equipment to exploit digital evidence and training in Tunisia.

60. In 2016, the Airport Communication Project of UNODC was extended to the Middle East and North Africa region with the aim of strengthening law enforcement capacity at international airports to detect and interdict suspicious travellers, in particular foreign terrorist fighters travelling to or from conflict zones. The Project promotes inter-agency collaboration, as well as direct, secure communication among international airports and provides on-site access to INTERPOL databases. It currently covers five countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. In December, 38 Moroccan police officers were trained in the identification of fraudulent travel documents. Training of law enforcement, customs and intelligence services in passenger profiling, risk analysis techniques, cargo screening, airport security and the analysis of advance passenger information and passenger name records will commence in early 2017. With the strong engagement of the

Government of Nigeria, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is currently developing a training project aimed at strengthening aviation security in Nigeria.

3. Addressing attacks inspired or enabled by ISIL

61. In West Africa, INTERPOL assists States in the utilization of digital evidence recovered from terrorist groups and supports the responses of States in the aftermath of major attacks, such as the attack in Ouagadougou in January 2016 and the attack in Grand-Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire, in March 2016.

62. In Mali, supporting the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (see S/2015/364, annex), the Justice and Corrections Section, the United Nations Police and the United Nations Mine Action Service at MINUSMA provide targeted capacity-building to assist authorities in effectively responding to terrorism and facilitate effective the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. This includes training the security forces of Mali to prevent and respond to suicide attacks. With support from the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, MINUSMA will donate 10 training kits on suicide bomb awareness to Mali. As at 31 October, 65 officers of the national police, gendarmerie and national guard of Mali had been trained. MINUSMA also supported a training funded by the Centre for 50 officers of the national police and the gendarmerie of Mali on the development of an anti-suicide bomb strategy in January 2017.

63. Pursuant to the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, UNODC has delivered technical assistance and capacity-building on proactive and special investigation techniques and on prosecution in terrorism cases, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, in countries of the Sahel, in particular Burkina Faso and the Niger.

4. Measures to counter the financing of ISIL

64. In October 2016, the Financial Action Task Force, the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering in West Africa and the Action Group against Money-Laundering in Central Africa published a joint study on the financing of terrorism in West and Central Africa.[33] The authors of the study considered a number of existing funding sources, the vulnerability of some sectors, in particular money remitters and non-profit organizations, and illicit cross-border cash transfers, as well as the links between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups, in particular in the Sahel. Four of the eight States of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and the Niger) recently incorporated into national law the revised uniform law on anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism adopted by the Union on 2 July 2015. However, an extremely limited number of terrorist financing cases have been prosecuted and sentenced, and West African financial intelligence units have received few suspicious transaction reports in relation to terrorist financing.

65. Most West African States have established a national asset-freezing mechanism pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), but these mechanisms remain untested, even with respect to individuals identified in

[33] Available from: www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf.

connection with the major terrorist attacks that occurred in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and the Niger in 2016. In April 2016, the Niger and Nigeria established a secure cooperation mechanism between their financial intelligence units to exchange operational financial information on Boko Haram and its supporters.

66. Terrorists continue to use kidnapping to generate funds. A project of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre on combating kidnapping for ransom aims at building the capacity of the Member States and non-governmental organizations of East, West and North Africa to achieve the safe release of hostages while also denying terrorist groups the benefits of ransom payments or political concessions. The Centre held the first capacity-building events in East and West Africa, in Addis Ababa in June and in Accra in November 2016, focusing on Government policymakers and kidnapping for ransom operators. A second workshop, for West African non-governmental organizations, was held in Dakar in December. A further three workshops will be held in North Africa in early 2017.

5. Prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration

67. In Morocco, returnees who are foreign terrorist fighters are arrested and investigated at length under the supervision of the prosecution service, in order to assess their psychological and ideological state before they are brought before a court. Within prisons, measures have been introduced to provide psychological and medical care and educational and ideological instruction to detained former fighters. They are given access to education and professional training, as well as training aimed at promoting the virtues of tolerance and peaceful coexistence provided by repentant former fighters and imams to demystify extremist discourse. Families are also involved in the de-radicalization process. The Mohammed VI Foundation for the Reintegration of Detainees plays a pivotal role in the reintegration of returnees through support programmes that encourage former detainees to join microprojects or become self-employed and that place former detainees in local businesses. Repentant detainees give interviews to the media to urge their fellow detainees to renounce violence and choose the path of reconciliation and dialogue.

68. As part of a five-year global project to strengthen the legal regime against foreign terrorist fighters in Middle Eastern, North African and South-East European States, funded by the European Union and others, UNODC, in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, continues to provide technical assistance to Member States, focusing on strengthening judicial cooperation in cases involving foreign terrorist fighters. To date, 208 officials have been trained.[34] The challenge of converting intelligence into evidence remains key to the successful prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters and suspected terrorists. The Executive Directorate and UNODC continue to work with relevant agencies to strengthen the capacities of States in this area and facilitated a fifth regional workshop for States of the Maghreb, held in Tunis in January 2017. Mindful of the link between terrorism and organized crime, the Niger recently extended the powers of its

[34] UNODC has carried out several regional activities on the management of violent prisoners for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon and is planning two national workshops for Egypt and Lebanon for 2017.

specialized counter-terrorism prosecutorial and adjudication units to deal with cases of organized crime.

69. Recognizing that a robust, effective prosecution capacity is essential to an effective criminal justice approach, MINUSMA continues to train magistrates of the recently established Specialized Judiciary Unit in Mali to investigate and prosecute terrorism, building on previous support to expand its technological capacity, establish secure holding cells for suspects under judicial investigation and ensure safe storage of arms and the proper maintenance of physical evidence. MINUSMA also continues to work with UNODC to train the Specialized Investigation Brigade of Mali, established in December 2016. Specialized training supported by Canada will enable the Brigade to analyse telephone metadata.

70. Within the framework of the partnership project of the European Union, the Government of Nigeria, UNODC and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on assisting Nigeria in strengthening rule of law-based criminal justice responses to terrorism, UNODC conducted 13 capacity-building activities designed to strengthen Nigeria's ability to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate terrorism cases.

71. At the request of the Office of the National Security Advisor of Nigeria, the European Union, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and UNODC held technical consultations and a high-level meeting with Nigeria in December on approaches to prosecuting, rehabilitating and reintegrating persons associated with Boko Haram. The consultations were the first of their kind to be held in West Africa and highlighted the broad scope of the challenges involved in developing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returnees.

72. In Mali, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and MINUSMA continue to train religious leaders and prison psychologists and provide vocational and educational programmes aimed at preventing radicalization and violent extremism in prison settings. In December, in collaboration with MINUSMA, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and the National Directorate of Prisons and Supervised Education of Mali, the Institute trained prison personnel in the management of potential violent extremist prisoners. A final workshop, to be held in early 2017, will focus on the approach of Mali to the rehabilitation and social reintegration of violent extremists and the development of a medium- and long-term programme of activities in the central prison in Bamako.

73. In Morocco, the Institute conducted two 1-week training courses in October 2016 for psychologists at the National Training Centre for Prison Staff and at the Prison Administration headquarters, as part of a long-term capacity-building project in the region on rehabilitation and reintegration in prisons. In addition, the Institute concluded its research to determine the feasibility of viable alternative programming to incarceration for young offenders in the juvenile justice system in Morocco.

6. Addressing conflict-related sexual violence and vulnerable groups

74. The treatment of children recruited by, or otherwise associated with, a terrorist group poses a significant challenge to many Member States. UNODC provides support to States of North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa in this regard and has held several subregional workshops. An expert meeting aimed at the development of

a UNODC handbook on the treatment of children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups was held in Vienna in December. In the context of the liberation of Sirte, the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya learned that some female migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, may have been abused, physically and sexually, and subsequently forced into marriage with ISIL fighters. There are a number of different concerns that must be taken into account in order to provide appropriate support to women and children who have been held captive by ISIL and systematically targeted for sexual violence, recognizing that they have been victimized.

7. Preventing and countering violent extremism

75. In November, the Sahel Working Group of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, with the participation of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, held an expert workshop and plenary meeting in Algiers on national plans to prevent violeat extremism. The discussions focused on national plans to prevent violent extremism, the establishment of networks among regional and national practitioners and the identification of resources. A joint meeting of OHCHR, the Commission of the African Union and the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism on gender and preventing violent extremism was also held in Algiers in November and focused on strengthening the gender dimension of the Commission and its member States, programmes and policies on violent extremism, analysis of promising practices and areas in need of further research and guidance. The participants shared good practices from Algeria, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, as well as from Latin American States.

76. The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations continues to implement projects under the four pillars of its mandate, which are youth, education, media and migration, focusing on empowering civil society groups led by young people. In November, in-person training for young peacebuilders in West Africa focused on providing young civil society leaders with the skills required to build more tolerant and peaceful communities.

77. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute is currently implementing a four-year pilot project on countering radicalization and violent extremism in the Sahel and the Maghreb, aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society and non-State actors, including women's and youth organizations, the media, cultural and religious associations and local communities, to deliver innovative activities and disseminate lessons learned and good practices. During 2016, the Institute also reviewed initiatives to counter violent extremism designed by non-governmental organizations in Maghreb and the Sahel, with a view to identifying certain initiatives for evaluation from 2017 onwards.

78. A project of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Protecting and Promoting Human Rights and the Rule of Law while Countering Terrorism continues to train law enforcement officials on human rights law and human rights-compliant responses to counter terrorism. A training event was held in Abuja in September for 25 mid-to-senior-ranking Nigerian law enforcement and security officials engaged in counter-terrorism to strengthen their knowledge of human rights laws and the principles applicable to their area of practice.

8. Use of information and communications technology and enhanced cooperation with the private sector

79. In December, at the third Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa, participants noted that the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection has not yet entered into force, and many African States lack the necessary legislation to tackle the threat and protect data. However, there is a need to assist African populations in protecting themselves online, especially in view of the continent's high cellular phone and smartphone penetration rate, and strengthening counter-narratives and alternative narratives to violent extremism and terrorism for African populations by developing content in multiple languages and strengthening digital literacy.

V. Observations

80. International, regional and national actors agree on the continued need for the development of sustained, coordinated responses to the grave threat posed by ISIL and associated groups and entities. There are 19 international instruments on counter-terrorism, as well as related regional instruments on international terrorism, and relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. More needs to be done, however, to enable effective international cooperation, as Member States continue to face significant challenges. This is due, in part, to a lack of harmonized national legislation. The focused engagement of the international community, in particular in the development of approaches to the management of returnees who are foreign terrorist fighters, responses to the use of information and communications technology and financing by terrorist groups and measures to prevent and prosecute attacks by ISIL, will continue to play an important role. It would be useful for Member States to continue to share effective national and regional practices and offer capacity-building assistance to support effective implementation of the requirements of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

United Nations S/2017/98

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 February 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 2 February 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and further to our previous letters regarding the grave and repeated violations and attacks committed by Turkey against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, I should like to apprise you of the new, brazen attacks that were perpetrated by the Turkish regime against the Syrian people and the sovereignty and territorial unity and integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. Those acts constitute a threat to international peace and security and are in line with the Turkish regime's open support for terrorism.

Over the past few days, the Turkish Army infiltrated Syrian territory and occupied a number of Syrian villages, including Ghuz and Abu al-Zandayn, which are located west of Bab city, with the aim of advancing towards Bab city, which lies north of Aleppo city.

These attacks are a continuation of the Turkish regime's aggression that began more than five years ago. That regime has provided various forms of military, material and logistical support to armed terrorist groups; facilitated the entry of foreign terrorist fighters into Syria; established training camps in its territory under direct Turkish military and intelligence supervision; provided covering fire in support of terrorist groups inside Syria; and armed those groups with the most modern weaponry. The Turkish regime has even provided them with medical care inside Turkey. It is also no secret that the regime has built defensive walls inside Syrian territory to the detriment of the landowners, something that is contrary to good-neighbourly relations.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic strongly condemns the repeated crimes and acts of aggression perpetrated by Turkey against the Syrian people and the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. Such actions are a bare-faced violation of Syrian sovereignty. They also flagrantly contravene the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of international law and all Security Council resolutions on Syria and counter-terrorism.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and

to put an end to the above-mentioned crimes that the Turkish regime is committing against the Syrian people and to the regime's repeated aggressions against Syrian territory. The Council must also compel the Turkish regime to implement the Council's resolutions on counter-terrorism and respect the sovereignty, territorial unity and people of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2017/99

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 January 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 12 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. David Clay has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-01627 (E) 030217

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/100

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 January 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mrs. Nerys Cross Smith has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-01629 (E) 030217

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/101

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 10 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Ms. Alice Hyde has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-01631 (E) 030217

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/102

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 February 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 30 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stating that Mr. Ivan P. Khoroshev has been appointed alternate representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-01633 (E) 030217

Please recycle

United Nations A/71/776–S/2017/103

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 February 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the state border with the Republic of Armenia during the month of January 2017 (see annex I); and the ceasefire violations record, as registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, during the month of January 2017 (see annex II).

I kindly request that the present letter and the annexes thereto be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-01733 (E) 100217

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the state border with the Republic of Armenia during the period from 1 to 31 January 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
01 January	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	31	Small arms and light weapons: 692
	Cinari	4	
	Aygedzor	3	
	Paravakar	3	
	Movses	2	
	Vazashen	1	
	Aygehovit	2	
	Berkaber	2	
	Nerkin Karkıraghbyur	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Koti	2	
	Baghanis	1	
	Jil	2	
	Yeraskh	7	
02 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	3	Small arms and light weapons: 25
	Aygedzor	1	
	Cinarı	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
03 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	4	Small arms and light weapons: 37
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Movses	1	
	Paravakar	1	
04 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	27	Small arms and light weapons: 361
	Cinari	18	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Chinari: 11;
	Paravakar	1	Aygedzor: 6)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 22 (Chinari)
	Berkaber	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
05 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	11	Small arms and light weapons: 109
	Chinarı	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Chinari)
	Paravakar	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
	Berkaber	1	
	Yeraskh	3	
06 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	8	Small arms and light weapons: 93
	Chinari	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Chinari)
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 7 (Chinari)
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
07 January	**Tavush region**	11	Small arms and light weapons: 48
	Aygedzor	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Movses	4	
	Berkaber	1	
		1	
08 January	**Tavush region**	17	Small arms and light weapons: 266
	Chinari	15	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 32
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Chinari)
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 4 (Chinari)
09 January	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	12	Small arms and light weapons: 94
		4	Large-calibre machine guns: 5 (Vahan)
	Chinari	2	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Berdavan	2	
	Vahan	2	
	Yeraskh		
10 January	**Tavush region**	8	Small arms and light weapons: 56
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Aygedzor)
	Aygedzor	5	
	Berdavan	1	
11 January	**Tavush region**	4	Small arms and light weapons: 21
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygedzor	2	
12 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	6	Small arms and light weapons: 37
	Aygepar	2	
	Chinari	1	
	Koti	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
13 January	**Tavush region**	11	Small arms and light weapons: 62
	Chinari	6	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Aygedzor)
	Paravakar	1	
14 January	**Tavush region**	8	Small arms and light weapons: 76
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Baghanis)
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
	Paravakar	1	
	Baghanis	3	
15 January	**Tavush region**	17	Small arms and light weapons: 146
	Chinari	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Chinari)
	Paravakar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Berkaber	1	
16 January	**Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	20	Small arms and light weapons: 272
	Chinari	6	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Aygedzor	7	
	Berkaber	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Chapni	2	
	Jil	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
17 January	**Tavush, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	19	Small arms and light weapons: 145
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Chinari: 1; Aygepar: 1)
	Chinari	1	
	Movses	5	
	Nerkin Karmiraghbyur	4	
	Aygepar	3	
	Berkaber	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
18 January	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	12	Small arms and light weapons: 105
	Aygedzor	6	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Chinari)
	Chinari	2	
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Daranak	1	
19 January	**Tavush region**	19	Small arms and light weapons: 270
	Chinari	9	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Movses	4	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Berdavan	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
20 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	12	Small arms and light weapons: 105
	Chinari	2	
	Aygedzor	3	
	Movses	3	
	Paravakar	1	
	Yeraskh	3	
21 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	9	Small arms and light weapons: 58
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Voskevan)
	Aygedzor	2	
	Movses	2	
	Voskevan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
22 January	**Tavus and Gegharkunik regions**	7	Small arms and light weapons: 109
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Ttujur)
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Koti	1	
	Ttujur	1	
23 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	10	Small arms and light weapons: 123
	Chinari	2	
	Aygedzor	3	
	Paravakar	4	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
24 January	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	13	Small arms and light weapons: 332
	Chinari	2	
	Aygedzor	6	
	Aygepar	2	
	Vazashen	1	
	Jil	2	
25 January	**Tavush and Vayots Dzor regions**	11	Small arms and light weapons: 185
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Paravakar	2	
	Sarigyugh	1	
	Kirants	2	
	Voskevan	3	
	Khndzorut	1	
26 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	17	Small arms and light weapons: 142
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Chinari	5	Large-calibre machine guns: 5 (Baghanis)
	Aygepar	1	
	Paravakar	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
	Voskepar	1	
	Koti	1	
	Voskevan	3	
	Baghanis	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
27 January	**Tavush region**	25	Small arms and light weapons: 294
	Chinari	14	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 65
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Chinari)
	Paravakar	3	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Voskevan	2	
	Berdavan	1	
28 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	3	Small arms and light weapons: 12
	Nerkin Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
29 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	4	Small arms and light weapons: 18
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
30 January	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	6	Small arms and light weapons: 82
	Chinari	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
31 January	**Tavush, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions**	5	Small arms and light weapons: 21
		1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Chinari)
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Khndzorut		

Annex II to the letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the period from 1 to 31 January 2017

Date	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
01 January	46	Small arms and light weapons: 1,248
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 102
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Kurapatkino)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 5 (Talish)
02 January	19	Small arms and light weapons: 228
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Talish)
03 January	33	Small arms and light weapons: 353
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 31 (Mount Karachuk: 4; Kurapatkino: 8; Seysulan: 4; Yarmja: 11; Namerli: 4)
		Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja)
04 January	27	Small arms and light weapons: 747
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Seysulan)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 2 (Sarijanli)
05 January	27	Small arms and light weapons: 430
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
06 January	18	Small arms and light weapons: 338
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Gyulistan)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 10 (Leonarkh)
		Grenade launchers: 2 (Talish)
07 January[a]	32	Small arms and light weapons: 392
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 33 (Mehdili: 18; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli: 5; Kurapatkino: 1; Leonarkh: 4; Gyulistan: 5)
08 January	40	Small arms and light weapons: 556
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 68
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Seysulan)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 3 (Seysulan)

Date	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
09 January	21	Small arms and light weapons: 379
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Seysulan: 2; Gyulistan: 5)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 10 (Gyulistan)
10 January	31	Small arms and light weapons: 652
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Mount Gyamish)
		Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Talish)
11 January	37	Small arms and light weapons: 1,005
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Gyulistan: 7; Yanshak: 1)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 110 (Dastagir: 10; Choporlu: 100)
12 January	25	Small arms and light weapons: 367
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 31 (Ashaghi Veysali: 1; Gyulistan: 30)
13 January	29	Small arms and light weapons: 689
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Mehdili: 4; Talish: 3; Gyulistan: 2)
14 January	28	Small arms and light weapons: 448
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Seysulan: 5; Yarmja: 13)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 30 (Choporlu)
		Grenade launchers: 1 (Seysulan)
15 January[c]	25	Small arms and light weapons: 313
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 30
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Mehdili)
16 January	66	Small arms and light weapons: 424
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Kengerli: 3; Yarmja: 7; Geytape: 2; Gyulistan: 10)
		Small-calibre mortars: 57 (Karakhanbeyli: 2; Karvend: 1; Geytape: 39; Bash Karvend: 1; Kengerli: 4; Taghibeyli: 7; Yarmja: 3)
17 January[c]	46	Small arms and light weapons: 701
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 29
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Yarmja)
18 January[d]	44	Small arms and light weapons: 486
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 29
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Bash Karvend: 2; Shikhlyar: 10; Seysulan: 6; Yarmja: 5)
		Grenade launchers: 1 (Talish)

Date	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
19 January	54	Small arms and light weapons: 497
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 39
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 101 (Mehdili: 8; Karvend: 10; Shikhlyar: 40; Sejsulan: 34; Yarmja: 9)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 37 (Verin Chaylu)
20 January[e]	48	Small arms and light weapons: 996
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Shikhlyar: 8; Seysulan: 1)
		Large-calibre machine guns: 1 (Kurapatkino)
21 January	58	Small arms and light weapons: 755
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Mehdili: 1; Shikhlyar: 5; Yarmja: 15)
		Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Seysulan)
22 January[f]	40	Small arms and light weapons: 920
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 26 (Karvend: 9; Sarijanli: 1; Talish: 16)
		Grenade launchers: 4 (Talish)
23 January	39	Small arms and light weapons: 327
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 36 (Bash Karvend: 26; Shikhlyar: 6; Levonarkh: 1; Yarmja: 3)
24 January	20	Small arms and light weapons: 142
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Bash Karvend: 18; Shikhlyar: 5)
		Grenade launchers: 1
		Small-calibre mortars: 5 (Seysulan: 1; Yarmja: 4)
25 January	11	Small arms and light weapons: 407
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
26 January	8	Small arms and light weapons: 63
27 January	21	Small arms and light weapons: 141
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Bash Karvend)
28 January	14	Small arms and light weapons: 173
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Levonarkh)
29 January	16	Small arms and light weapons: 235
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
30 January	14	Small arms and light weapons: 85
		Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
		Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Seysulan)

Date	*Number of incidents*	*Types of weapon/number of shots*
31 January	20	Small arms and light weapons: 233 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30 (Mehdili)

[a] At 11.40 a.m., in the vicinity of the village of Mehdili, Aram Papoyan, a tractor driver, was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

[b] On 15 January, Garik Vardanyan, a soldier who had been wounded by the Azerbaijani side on 30 December 2016, died in the hospital.

[c] At 10.40 a.m., in the vicinity of the village of Karvend, Artik Balayan, a soldier, was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

[d] At 2 p.m., in the vicinity of the village of Horadiz, Andranik Musikyan, a soldier, was fatally wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

[e] At 3.05 p.m., in the vicinity of the village of Taghibeyli, Aleksan Avanesyan, a soldier, was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

[f] At 11.25 p.m., in the vicinity of the village of Yusifjanli, Karen Ulubabyan, a soldier, was fatally wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations S/2017/104

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 February 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 1 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a concept note for the open debate on the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks, to be held on 13 February 2017.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-01674 (E) 060217

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the open debate of the Security Council on the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks

I. Introduction

Ukraine will hold an open debate of the Security Council on the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks in connection with the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".

The debate will take into account the results of the Arria-formula meeting of the Security Council on counter-terrorism, organized by the delegation of Ukraine on 21 November 2016, which attested to an urgent need for Member States to maintain a high level of protection of critical infrastructures and to consolidate international efforts to increase resilience against terrorist threats, so as to prevent the loss of human life and the disruption in delivery of critical services.

II. Background

The terrorist threat has recently been growing, with Al-Qaida, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, al-Nusra and the like proliferating at a fast pace in many regions of the world.

Objects of critical infrastructure have long been attractive targets for terrorist groups. Therefore, they have to be protected against a growing number of diverse threats, both physical and cyber.

Banking and finance; telecommunications; emergency services; air, maritime and rail transportation; and energy and water supply are all essential elements of modern life, along with proper functioning of governmental structures.

Attacks against such objects can result in civilian casualties, lead to damage and loss of property on a large scale, disrupt proper functioning of public services, and create chaos in societies. They may also cause widespread environmental damage, as well as significantly undermine national defence capabilities.

The advancement of science and technologies has made the objects of critical infrastructure tightly interlinked. Such interdependency therefore makes them more vulnerable to any disruptions of so-called single points of failure. Attacks against critical infrastructure dependent on information and communications technologies can be a threat multiplier with a powerful destabilizing effect.

Moreover, the environmental consequences of attacks on certain critical infrastructure could impact both a host State and neighbouring States. In this case, enhanced cooperation of relevant state authorities is of great importance.

Since in most cases, objects of critical infrastructure constitute commercial property, state authorities have to establish close cooperation with the private sector.

This requires elaboration of certain emergency preparedness standards with which the private sector would comply, so as to ensure preparedness for preventing or, if need arises, countering terrorist threats, as well as managing the consequences of possible disasters.

For that purpose, the element of protection of critical infrastructure should be properly reflected in global and national terrorism prevention programmes.

Analysis of international experience in this field points to the need for addressing a number of issues, among which are coordination and cooperation of public authorities and exchange of information on existing threats and possible vulnerabilities (arising, for example, from inadequate controls at the borders and lack of a holistic security approach, of technology and of dedicated security forces); organization of public-private security partnerships; and application of a risk-assessment approach to preventing and countering threats to critical infrastructure.

Striking examples of incidents that demonstrate such a need to improve the system of protection of critical infrastructure and strengthen international cooperation in this area in particular include the recent terrorist attacks in Belgium (at the Brussels airport on 22 March 2016), Turkey (on the government buildings in Ankara in February and March 2016 and bombings at the Istanbul international airport in June 2016) and Iraq (on a chemical plant near the city of Taj on 11 May 2016).

III. Objective

Member States are encouraged to explore ways to assess vulnerabilities, interdependencies and capabilities of, as well as the cascading effects of the impacts of terrorist attacks on, their critical infrastructure. They are also invited to consider possible preventive measures while developing national strategies and policies.

IV. Questions for consideration

- What tools do States have in place to improve the safety and security of particularly vulnerable targets, such as infrastructure facilities and public places, as well as the response to terrorist attacks perpetrated against them?
- What methods have to be promoted by States to improve responsiveness and resilience to terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure, in particular taking into account recent advances in science and technologies, in particular information and communications technologies?
- How can States strengthen the capacity of both the public and private sectors and increase public-private partnerships in order to prevent and react in an efficient manner to potential risks and threats to critical infrastructure?
- What mechanisms or platforms can be established or utilized to facilitate the development and sharing of best practices on the protection of critical infrastructure of importance to States and regions, or of international significance?

- How can the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other international and regional organizations contribute to further enhancing the effectiveness of the overall efforts to counter terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure at national, regional and international levels, in particular as regards the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and other related instruments?

V. Outcome

The Security Council may wish to consider adopting a resolution aimed at mobilizing international efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure through enhancing national capabilities and resilience in the face of such threats and promoting inter-State cooperation in this field.

VI. Format and briefers

The open debate will be held on 13 February 2017 at 10 a.m. in the Security Council Chamber.

The following speakers will brief the Security Council: Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General; Hamid Ali Rao, Deputy Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Chris Trelawny, Special Adviser on Maritime Security and Facilitation to the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization; Olli Heinonen, Senior Adviser on Science and Non-proliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and representatives of the private sector (to be confirmed).

The format of this open debate will follow the relevant established practice of the Security Council.

It is expected that, under rules 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, concerned Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and initiatives will participate in the open debate.

In accordance with paragraph 29 of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2010/507), all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, are encouraged to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Speakers who wish to do so may circulate, if necessary, the text of a more detailed statement to Council members and participants, without making oral statements that exceed five minutes.

17-01674

United Nations S/2017/105

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 February 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 31 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit herewith a non-paper, compiled as a courtesy by the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, summarizing the ideas expressed by the participants in the open debate convened on 10 January 2017 on the subject "Conflict prevention and sustaining peace" (see annex).

I am grateful for your contribution to the open debate. We hope that the summary will serve as inspiration and support for our common efforts to reenergize the fundamental mission of the United Nations to prevent conflict and sustain peace.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative

17-01699 (E) 130217

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 31 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Non-paper of the open debate of the Security Council held on 10 January 2017 on the subject "Conflict prevention and sustaining peace"

Introduction

The open debate of the Security Council on the subject "Conflict prevention and sustaining peace", which was held on 10 January 2017, was organized by Sweden as President of the Security Council for the month of January. The meeting was chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and President of the Security Council, Margot Wallström. The meeting was the first formal opportunity for the newly appointed Secretary-General to meet the members of the Security Council and communicate his vision to the broader United Nations membership.

Over the past two years, a number of normative developments have generated momentum for greater prevention efforts across the United Nations. With the arrival of a new Secretary-General, who has highlighted prevention of conflict as one of his priorities, such developments have the potential to lead to a genuine shift in how the United Nations addresses threats to peace and security. The participants in the open debate sought to identify challenges to conflict prevention and sustaining peace and propose steps to overcome them. The aim was to lay the foundation for a more proactive form of cooperation between the Security Council and the Secretary-General, with a view to enabling more strategic responses.

During the debate, the Secretary-General had the opportunity to outline to the Security Council his vision for restoring trust and putting prevention at the heart of the work of the United Nations. Council members and other Member States had the opportunity to provide political support for that vision and to express their views on how best to maximize the prevention potential of the United Nations. More than 90 countries and regional organizations expressed their support for his vision.

The present non-paper, compiled as a courtesy by the Permanent Mission of Sweden, is a summary of the ideas expressed by the participants during the open debate. It does not represent an endorsement of the proposals and their content by any Member State or participant. A full record of the debate is available on the website of the Security Council (see S/PV.7857).

Vision of the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General used the open debate to lay out his vision for a renewed emphasis on conflict prevention and sustaining peace. He underlined the imperative for greater attention to and investment in prevention activities. He noted that multiple and interconnected drivers of conflict, including social, developmental, economic and environmental, meant that local and national conflicts could easily spread across borders and regions. He said that the United Nations and its partners must reduce fragmentation in their strategies, structures and operations by connecting efforts on peace and security, sustainable development and human rights.

He said that the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and the "sustaining peace" resolutions showed intergovernmental support for such an approach and that the reforms that he had put in place were aimed at achieving that.

The Secretary-General stated that the work and the reform of the United Nations development system must be linked with that of the peace and security architecture, with support from the General Assembly and the Security Council. The United Nations should take a "whole-of-organization" approach to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, with the aim of addressing the root causes of conflict. That included carrying out humanitarian activities, building resilience, ensuring the participation of women and girls, ending youth unemployment and investing in inclusive and cohesive societies in which diversity would be seen as an asset rather than a threat.

The Secretary-General called for a "surge in diplomacy for peace" that employed the capacity of all actors. He noted his commitment to increasing the mediation capacity of the United Nations and called upon the Security Council to put the tools already at its disposal to better use. He underlined the central importance of building trust between Member States themselves and in their relations with the United Nations as a prerequisite for the successful prevention of armed conflict. He committed himself to fostering a more trustful and honest relationship with the Council.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General underlined the common interest in putting peace first, noting that the United Nations could respond more swiftly when warning signs emerged by working with regional organizations. War was never inevitable, but a matter of choice, he said, stressing that, likewise, peace was not inevitable, but a result of difficult decisions, hard work and compromise. Therefore, peace could not be taken for granted, but must be the priority for all.

Challenges to sustaining peace

While it was recognized that the main responsibility for conflict prevention and sustaining peace lay with Member States, there was broad and strong support for the call by the Secretary-General to put prevention at the heart of the work of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Member States also acknowledged challenges to the achievement of that goal, as outlined below.

New nature of threats and challenges

Member States agreed with the Secretary-General that today's crises were driven by a range of complex and interconnected causes, such as social, economic, gender, ethnic, religious and ideological issues and environmental degradation, including climate change. The nexus between poverty, human rights and security was identified as a crucial driver of conflict, which needed to be addressed in an integrated fashion to enable the development of peaceful societies.

In addition, the transboundary nature of modern conflicts and the existence of multiple, often interrelated conflicts or areas of instability have posed challenges to the ability of the United Nations to mount responses. Similarly, conflicts driven by violent extremism and carried out through acts of terrorism, usually directed towards the most vulnerable, need new approaches and responses.

Fragmentation within the United Nations system

Member States identified fragmentation and lack of coordination across the United Nations system as major barriers to effective conflict prevention. They noted the continued presence of institutional silos preventing the system from working coherently to address the root causes of conflict, such as a lack of development, human rights violations and competition for resources.

Member States also identified a lack of coherence across the major organs of the United Nations, namely, the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as with agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system.

Role of the Security Council

Member States underlined that the Security Council had the tools required to enhance the prevention of armed conflict but did not use them sufficiently. Several speakers noted that the Council sometimes failed to react to warnings because of a lack of political will or other political considerations, instead responding only when conflicts were already under way. A number of speakers underlined the need for Council reform, and several questioned the use of the veto in situations involving gross violations of human rights.

Member States noted that political rather than military solutions were needed to sustain peace. They questioned whether peacekeeping and special mission mandates were sufficiently flexible to allow for activities relating to sustaining peace and conflict prevention. Several Member States underlined the meagre levels of funding available for such activities, noting that the cost of peacekeeping operations was immense in comparison.

Policy recommendations

Member States called for a new political consensus on prevention. The rich discussion yielded a range of policy recommendations in support of the efforts of the Secretary-General to rebalance the approach of the United Nations to peace and security.

Role of the United Nations, the Secretariat and the United Nations system

Member States emphasized the need for an open and mutually reinforcing relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. They urged the Secretary-General to use his powers under the Charter of the United Nations to bring issues to the attention of the Security Council at an early stage. They called upon him to provide honest assessments based on rigorous analysis to the Council and to tell its members what they needed to know, not only what they wanted to hear, which should lead to increased situational awareness and more horizon-scanning meetings with the Council. Such assessments should draw upon analysis from across the United Nations system, pointing to the need for enhanced capacity for integrated analysis and planning, as well as early warning capacity. The need for increased capacity to analyse and manage risks from emerging threats, including the effects of climate change, was also raised. The Secretary-General was encouraged to increase the use of his good offices as a form of preventive diplomacy.

Many Member States welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General to increase coordination across the Organization and encouraged him to continue to take forward structural reform. The priority for the entire United Nations system should be prevention and addressing the root causes of conflict. Member States underlined the need for coordination across all three pillars of the system, from the field level to Headquarters. They also encouraged better collaboration between the Security Council, as well as other United Nations organs, and the Peacebuilding Commission, which could be a valuable source of information for the Council's deliberations and help to build coherence within the United Nations system.

Member States welcomed the comprehensive peace reviews conducted in 2015 and their focus on prevention across all stages of conflict. Such an approach involved moving from the idea of conflict management to a focus on prevention and tackling the root causes of conflict, which would include ensuring adequate and predictable funding for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including through the achievement of a better balance between peacekeeping and prevention in budgets.

Role of the Security Council

The Security Council was encouraged to use existing tools for the prevention of armed conflict to better effect, including through greater use of Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter. Speakers underlined the importance of mediation and encouraged greater investment therein. Numerous speakers underlined the role of regional and subregional organizations in sustaining peace and encouraged greater partnership and collaboration between the United Nations and such organizations.

A number of Member States, while recognizing the need for national leadership, called upon the Security Council to act consistently, including with regard to respect for national sovereignty. It was noted that, if the Secretary-General used his prerogative under Article 99 to bring matters to the attention of the Council, the members of the Council must show the political will to respond.

Recalling the outcome of the reviews conducted in 2015, Member States encouraged the Council to consider the mandates of peacekeeping and special missions and ensure that prevention was well reflected therein. Member States emphasized that one size did not fit all and that mandates must be tailored to particular contexts. The need for transitional justice as a means of preventing a return to conflict was also mentioned.

Role of Member States

Member States emphasized that the main responsibility for ending conflicts lay with States themselves. Many speakers underlined the fact that development and human rights were central to sustaining peace. Recognizing the need to address the root causes of instability and conflict, Member States emphasized the need for the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Taken together with the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on sustaining peace, the 2030 Agenda was the basis for systematic and structural prevention.

Many speakers underlined the need for "whole-of-society" approaches to sustaining peace. All stakeholders must be active partners in building peaceful and sustainable societies. Speakers underlined the important role that religious and

traditional leaders could play in preventing conflict. They also identified the important role of women, including as mediators, in preventing conflict and delivering lasting peace and encouraged the Secretary-General to pay particular attention thereto. The role of young people in building sustainable peace was also emphasized.

Conclusion

During the open debate, Member States and the United Nations reaffirmed their strong commitment to prevention. The need for the Secretary-General and the Security Council, working with the rest of the United Nations system, Member States and regional organizations, to utilize existing tools for preventive diplomacy and to embed prevention across the United Nations system was emphasized.

The interconnected nature of the challenges facing the world, which were leading to more complex conflicts, was underlined. To prevent such conflicts from emerging, the United Nations and its partners must address the drivers and root causes thereof, which requires an integrated approach that brings together peace and security, sustainable development and human rights. A proactive United Nations structure that abandons silos in favour of coordinated and integrated ways of working is needed.

That Member States bore the primary responsibility for protecting their populations and preventing conflict was underscored. However, the capacity of the United Nations for early action in identifying and responding to emerging conflicts should be enhanced. A trusting and open relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council can be a strong base upon which to build a United Nations that has prevention at the heart of its work.

United Nations S/2017/106

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 February 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 28 January-2 February 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. **Churkin**

17-02092 (E) 140217 140217

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Annex to the letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (28 January 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,155.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of illegal armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 104.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The following armed opposition units joined the ceasefire: Faylaq al-Sham, Front for the People of the Levant (Army of Mujahidin, Revolutionaries of the Levant), Sultan Murad Brigade, Idlib Army, Hawks of the Levant, Rahman Corps, Levant Front, Fastaqim group, Jaysh al-Izzah, Victory Army, First Coastal Division, Army of Islam, Martyrs of Islam Brigade, Tajammu' Ahrar Asha'ir al-Janub, Jabhat Thuwar Suriyah, Military Council of Qunaytirah, Sayf al-Sham, Mujahidin of Hawran, Ahrar Nawa, Mu'taz Billah, Firqah al-Khamisah (Fifth Division), 18 March, Jaysh al-Thawrah (Army of the Revolution), Shabab al-Sunnah, Umari, Ababil Army, Furqan Brigade, Liwa' al-Awwal (First Brigade), Faylaq al-Awwal (First Brigade), Firqat al-Maghawir, Islamic Dawn (Fajr al-Islam), Izz bin Abdulsalam, Karamah Brigade, Lions of the Sunnah, Special Missions Brigade, Haramayn Brigade, Salah al-Din Brigade, Homs Brigade, Sons of Khalid Brigade, Fallujat Hawran (Division), Qasiyn Brigades, Ansar al-Islam, Jaydur Hawran (Brigade), Hashim Division, 46th Infantry, Firqat al-Haq, Amud Hawran, Mu'tasim Battalion, Martyrs for Freedom, Ahmad al-Abdu Forces, Lions of the East, 99th Division, Martyr Ra'id al-Misri Brigade, Qadisiyah Division, Thabitin Army, Liwa' Tawhid Kata'ib Hawran, Martyr Nabil Battalion, Knights of Hawran Brigade, Southern Storm Brigade, Karamah Company, Levant Liberation Brigade, Asha'ir Division, Fajr al-Tawhid and Liyajat Unification Brigade.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported five violations in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any violations over the past 24 hours.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (29 January 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,155.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 104.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The following armed opposition units joined the ceasefire: Faylaq al-Sham, Front for the People of the Levant (Army of Mujahidin, Revolutionaries of the Levant), Sultan Murad Brigade, Idlib Army, Hawks of the Levant, Rahman Corps, Levant Front, Fastaqim group, Jaysh al-Izzah, Victory Army, First Coastal Division, Army of Islam, Martyrs of Islam Brigade, Tajammu' Ahrar Asha'ir al-Janub, Jabhat Thuwar Suriyah, Military Council of Qunaytirah, Sayf al-Sham, Mujahidin of Hawran, Ahrar Nawa, Mu'taz Billah, Firqah al-Khamisah (Fifth Division), 18 March, Jaysh al-Thawrah (Army of the Revolution), Shabab al-Sunnah, Umari, Ababil Army, Furqan Brigade, Liwa' al-Awwal (First Brigade), Faylaq al-Awwal (First Brigade), Firqat al-Maghawir, Islamic Dawn (Fajr al-Islam), Izz bin Abdulsalam, Karamah Brigade, Lions of the Sunnah, Special Missions Brigade, Haramayn Brigade, Salah al-Din Brigade, Homs Brigade, Sons of Khalid Brigade, Fallujat Hawran (Division), Qasiyn Brigades, Ansar al-Islam, Jaydur Hawran (Brigade), Hashim Division, 46th Infantry, Firqat al-Haq, Amud Hawran, Mu'tasim Battalion, Martyrs for Freedom, Ahmad al-Abdu Forces, Lions of the East, 99th Division, Martyr Ra'id al-Misri Brigade, Qadisiyah Division, Thabitin Army, Liwa' Tawhid Kata'ib Hawran, Martyr Nabil Battalion, Knights of Hawran Brigade, Southern Storm Brigade, Karamah Company, Levant Liberation Brigade, Asha'ir Division, Fajr al-Tawhid and Liyajat Unification Brigade.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported two violations in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported 14 violations of the consolidated agreement in the following governorates: 7 in Aleppo, 4 in Damascus, 2 in Homs and 1 in Ladhiqiyah.

Investigations of these incidents have revealed that 1 violation was committed by the Nusrah Front. The other 13 violations have not been confirmed by Russia.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (30 January 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,155.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 has increased to 109.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported three violations: two in Hama governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported two violations of the consolidated agreement: one in Idlib governorate and one in Dar'a governorate.

The violations reported by the Turkish representative office have not been confirmed by the Russian representative office.

Humanitarian bulletin of the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (30 January 2017)

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation

The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides carried out 12 humanitarian operations in Aleppo city (in the Qasilah and Shaykh Maqsud districts (twice), at a retirement home in the Qaralaq district, at schools in the Karm-al-Da'da', Akramiyah, Khalidiyah, Uwayjah, Sulyamaniah and Ashrafiyah districts, and at the mosques in the Hamdaniyah-1 and Aqyul districts), during which more than 7.5 tons of bread, 3,000 portions of hot food and 1,200 food parcels were delivered to civilians.

In total, 15.2 tons of humanitarian cargoes were distributed to the population.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 9,960 inhabitants.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by international organizations

Russian airplanes parachuted 20.7 tons of humanitarian cargoes (food products) to the city of Dayr al-Zawr, which was received by the Syrian authorities through the United Nations.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (31 January 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, seven ceasefire agreements have been signed with Jaramana, Mulayhah, Zabdin and Dayr al-Asafir in Damascus governorate, and with Halban, Bardunah and Duwaybah in Hama governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,162.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 remains unchanged at 109.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported six violations: three in Ladhiqiyah governorate and three in Hama governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported nine violations of the consolidated agreement in the following governorates: three in Damascus, two in Aleppo, two in Homs, one in Idlib and one in Ladhiqiyah.

During its investigations of these incidents, the Russian representative office was unable to confirm the nine violations.

Humanitarian bulletin of the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (31 January 2017)

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation

The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides carried out eight humanitarian operations: six in Aleppo city, one in Ladhiqiyah city and one at Jaramana in Damascus governorate.

More than 3.2 tons of bread, 1,000 portions of hot food and 400 food parcels were delivered to civilians in Aleppo city (in the Furqan district, at schools in the Jabiriyah, Sukkari and Ballat districts and at the railway vocational college in the Shaykh Taha district) and to Jaramana in Damascus governorate.

Over 770 children's backpacks and gift sets were delivered to pupils at a primary school in the Maydan district of Aleppo city and at the Hero Wahib Khalil Mustafa Secondary School in Ladhiqiyah city.

In total, 5.7 tons of humanitarian cargoes were distributed to the population.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 4,037 inhabitants.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by international organizations

Russian airplanes parachuted 20.8 tons of humanitarian cargoes (food products) to the city of Dayr al-Zawr, which was received by the Syrian authorities through the United Nations.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by other States

Over the past 24 hours, no other States have carried out humanitarian operations in Syria.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (1 February 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, eight ceasefire agreements have been signed with Danin, Junas and Jibrin in Hama governorate; Ma'raba, Duma, Adra al-Ummaliyah and Adra al-Balad in Damascus governorate; and Zaydal in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,170.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 remains unchanged at 109.

Over the past 24 hours, Syrian government forces have liberated eight populated areas from armed groups of the international terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Six populated areas — Bijan, Tall Bijan, Sirdah, Qulay'ah, Khirbat al-Tuba and Kasrah — are in Aleppo governorate and two — Marhitan and Tadmuriyah — are in Homs governorate. Syrian government forces have liberated a total of 29 populated areas since 1 January 2017.

Over the past 24 hours, 36.7 square kilometres have fallen under the control of government forces. A total area of 913.1 square kilometres has been liberated since 1 January 2017.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported three violations: two in Ladhiqiyah governorate and one in Hama governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported nine violations of the consolidated agreement in the following governorates: three in Damascus, three in Aleppo, two in Ladhiqiyah and one in Dar'a.

During its investigations of these incidents, the Russian representative office was unable to confirm the nine violations.

Humanitarian bulletin of the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (1 February 2017)

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out five humanitarian operations in Aleppo city (at schools in the Qatirji, Firdaws al-Jadidah, A'zamiyah, Tishrin and Ma'aliy districts), during which more than 3.4 tons of bread and 1,500 portions of hot food were delivered to civilians.

In total, 3.7 tons of humanitarian cargoes were distributed to the population. Humanitarian assistance was provided to 4,010 inhabitants.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by other States and international organizations

Under the United Nations winter programme, non-food humanitarian aid, such as thermal blankets, winter clothing and children's kits, were distributed in the eastern part of Aleppo city. More than 5 tons of food received through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) were delivered to inhabitants of Jibrin.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (2 February 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, seven ceasefire agreements have been signed with Hawsh Nasri, Hawsh al-Dawahirah, Tall al-Surah, Hawsh al-Farah, Maydan and Hafir al-Tahta in Damascus governorate and Qusaybah in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,177.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 remains unchanged at 109.

The number of populated areas which Syrian government forces have liberated from armed groups of the international terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 1 January 2017 remains unchanged at 29.

Over the past 24 hours, 20.5 square kilometres have fallen under the control of government forces. A total area of 933.6 square kilometres has been liberated since 1 January 2017.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported three violations in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported seven violations of the consolidated agreement: five in Damascus governorate and two in Hama governorate.

During its investigations of these incidents, the Russian representative office confirmed one ceasefire violation. It has not confirmed the other six incidents.

United Nations A/71/784–S/2017/107

General Assembly
Security Council

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8 February 2017
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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 34
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 25 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of December 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-01990 (E) 150217 170217

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Annex to the identical letters dated 25 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in December 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
7 December	0810	Members of an enemy patrol escorting a flag replacement detail at an enemy positions opposite Ayta al-Sha'b pointed a tank cannon at Lebanese territory. The flag was replaced at 1015 hours.
	1030 1200	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Kafr Killa-Udaysah highway at point B82, three journalists from Israeli television approached with cameras, escorted by an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle. The journalists asked questions to civilians passing by on the Lebanese side. "We are Israeli television. We would like to speak with you. How is the situation in the South?"... and so on. No one responded to them.
10 December	0930	From inside the occupied Shab'a Farms at its Jabal al-Summaqah post, the Israeli enemy pointed a tank cannon at the Lebanese Army L360 position.
12 December	1520	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, at the Birkat al-Naqqar location, a tank carrier loaded with cement blocks and steel posts approached, escorted by an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a troop carrier and four Defender vehicles. Enemy personnel performed maintenance and installed the blocks inside the post. They left in the direction of occupied territory at 1630 hours.
15 December	2100 2140	The Israeli enemy fired eight flares over its Zabdin post inside the occupied Shab'a Farms and fired a mortar shell at the surrounding area.
22 December	1230	On the outskirts of the town of Marun al-Ra's, near the Lebanese-Palestinian border opposite points B52 and B52-2, while some Lebanese farmers were inspecting their fields, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Defender vehicles and two Hummer vehicles approached from inside occupied territory. Some 15 soldiers disembarked, took up combat positions, cocked and aimed their weapons at the farmers, and threw two smoke bombs that landed across from the farmers inside occupied Palestinian territory.
23 December	1106 1116	Opposite the town of Yarun near point BP17, members of an Israeli enemy patrol pointed a Merkava tank cannon at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol stationed inside Lebanese territory.
31 December	1200	Inside the occupied Shab'a farms at the Bastrah location, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles approached. Several soldiers disembarked without violating the Blue Line (which demarcates area with regard to which Lebanon maintains a claim) and attempted unsuccessfully to abduct some herders. The enemy soldiers directed curses and abuse in Arabic at said herders, and threatened them. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1330 hours.

Sea violations committed in December 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 December	0435	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of 20 seconds.
	0439	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 170 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 December	1930 1940	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two periods of 40 seconds and 30 seconds, respectively.
	1533	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1945 2005	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch opened fire from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters at Lebanese fishing boats inside Lebanese territorial waters, and fired six flares over Lebanese territorial waters.
6 December	1029	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 204 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
7 December	1039	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 280 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
8 December	0646	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 280 metres inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0650 hours, it again violated the boundary, for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 300 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
10 December	0604	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
11 December	0352	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 407 metres inside Lebanese territorial waters. Its crew also directed a searchlight towards said waters for a five-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0551 hours, it again violated the boundary, for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 460 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. Its crew also directed a searchlight in the direction of said waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0605 hours, it violated the boundary again, for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 465 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0600	From inside occupied Palestinian waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy launch broadcast in Hebrew over loudspeakers, sounded warning sirens and released two explosive objects.
	1806	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its Ra's al-Naqurah position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters.
12 December	0221	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 315 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0302	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a seven-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 540 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0340	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its Ra's al-Naqurah position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight at Lebanese territorial waters for a 10-second period.
	1030	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a period of one hour and twenty-five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 December	1235	In the open sea off Ra's al-Naqurah, owing to sea swells, buoy No. 7, which had been put in place by the Israeli enemy in the so-called line of buoys on a previous date, moved out of position. It moved north towards Lebanese territorial waters.
	1240	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1536	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
21 December	0300	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
	0300 0335	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight at Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period.
	1552	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 142 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 December	1618	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 December	1615	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
27 December	1737 1739	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters.

Air violations committed in December 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 December	1930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Naqurah.
5 December	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
6 December	1440	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
7 December	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2315 hours over Naqurah.
	1920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
8 December	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1015 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1345	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Batrun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1505 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 December	0030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0510 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1300 hours over Rumaysh.
12 December	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1320 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1845	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Ra's al-Naqurah. It circled over Lebanese territorial waters and released 27 decoy flares before leaving at 1920 hours.
14 December	0850	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They left at 0900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1005	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Beirut. They left at 1020 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1230	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1255 hours over the sea west of Shikka.
	1416	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Batrun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1500 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
15 December	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1515 hours over the sea off Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1145	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Beirut. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
20 December	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1010 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It left at 2310 hours over Naqurah.
22 December	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It left at 2320 hours over Aytarun.
28 December	2215 2230	Two glowing objects were observed at low altitude over the towns of Kafr Killa and Dayr Mimas.
29 December	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1010 hours over Naqurah.

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Letter dated 3 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a concept note for the ministerial open debate on the theme "Maintenance of international peace and security: conflicts in Europe", to be held on 21 February 2017 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 3 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the ministerial open debate on the theme "Maintenance of international peace and security: conflicts in Europe", to be held on 21 February 2017

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 signalled the beginning of a new era in European security. With the end of the military and ideological stand-off that had divided the continent for almost five decades, there were high expectations that Europe would become a strategically stable continent.

Despite such expectations, new challenges and threats emerged on the European continent in the 1990s, some of which were triggered by broader geopolitical processes, while others were caused by religious, ethnic or territorial disputes. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, as well as the Transnistrian conflict that erupted at the end of the twentieth century, had a negative impact on the European security architecture and deepened rivalries and controversies in the region.

The conflicts that have emerged in Europe in the twenty-first century, exacerbated by the dangerous developments in the countries with protracted or unresolved conflicts, have reached a tipping point and pose a critical risk to the stability of the entire region. Those conflicts now constitute a serious threat to international peace and security and should be properly addressed by the Security Council as a matter of priority.

Background and key challenges

The Security Council is currently seized of the situations in Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine. The Council also discusses the work of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on a quarterly basis. The developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh region are another issue of concern that has been raised repeatedly during open debates of the Council and in the letters of relevant delegations to the Secretary-General that have been circulated as documents of the Council. Conflicts in Europe feature prominently in the annual briefings of the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Despite the attention given to such conflicts by the Security Council, the great majority of existing mechanisms for their settlement are not yielding the expected results, and the relevant Council resolutions on the subject are not being implemented in full.

As a result, the ongoing and protracted conflicts in Europe could lead to the further deterioration of the security situation and constitute a threat to regional and

global stability. They have called into question the security architecture in Europe and exacerbated other security issues related to the economic, energy and human dimensions.

Objectives and questions

The aim of the open debate is to assess existing threats to regional and international peace and security caused by conflicts in Europe and to review ways to respond to the continuous instability on the continent and the dangerous developments in the countries with post-conflict situations or protracted conflicts.

The participants in the open debate are invited to address the following questions:

- What is the role of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in addressing protracted, new and emerging conflicts in Europe, especially those that do not fit into traditional security paradigms?
- What are the lessons learned from and the best practices and examples of cooperation among the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union in conflict resolution in Europe, and how can such cooperation be made more effective?
- How should the Security Council address situations in which parties to the conflict do not have the political will to fulfil their obligations under existing agreements and resolutions?
- What tools and options are available to the Security Council and the Secretary-General for developing confidence-building and other measures aimed at preventing the escalation of conflicts in Europe?
- Can some of the practices and experience of and the relevant lessons learned from the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in conflict resolution in Africa and the best conflict resolution practices in other regions be of value in resolving protracted and active conflicts in Europe?

Time and venue

The open debate will take place on 21 February 2017 at 10 a.m. in the Security Council Chamber.

The format of the open debate will follow the established practice of the Security Council with regard to ministerial-level meetings.

In accordance with rules 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, it is expected that concerned Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and initiatives will participate in the open debate.